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INTERSTATE AGREEMENT FOR ELECTORAL REFORM
Adam Schleifer*

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will consider how an interstate agreement pursuant to
Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution could provide a subconstitutional legal alternative to the much-debated and oft-maligned
political mechanics of the Electoral College system. The current gloss
on the Compacts Clause and the Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to
interstate agreements may make it possible for a number of states to
come together to obviate the Electoral College without resort to
constitutional amendment. More modestly, investigating how this might
be so provides an opportunity for applied analysis of the underscrutinized field of interstate agreements, which may prove useful as
states employ experimentalist and cooperative strategies to meet
challenges that span state lines. Before exploring this legal terrain, it
serves to explore the political and strategic preconditions for such an
effort.
With every close presidential contest, the pitch of the debate
regarding the electoral process seems to increase, as attackers and
defenders of the current system explore questions of democratic process
and legitimacy at the wholesale level, and present mixed theoretic and
empirical arguments as to group strategic benefits at the retail level.1
*

Law Clerk to the Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein, United States District Judge, Southern District
of New York 2006-2007; J.D., Columbia 2006. Sincere thanks go to Professor Michael Dorf of
Columbia Law School for thoughtful review and helpful suggestions. All errors and oversights are
my own.
1. For a defense of the electoral college, see generally JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST
DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (1975);
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION,
AND THE PARTY SYSTEM (1971); ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM (1994). The attacks against the Electoral
College have been numerous. See, e.g., Proposals for Electoral College Reform: Hearing before
the Subcommittee on the Constitution on H.J. Res. 28 and H.J. Res. 43, 105th Cong. 9 (1997)
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Supporters of the Electoral College argue that the system
guarantees a truly national presidential race by giving an increased voice
to otherwise vulnerable small states, reflecting the values of federalism
important to the Framers.2 Such arguments, though familiar to civics
class alumni, have become increasingly deconstructed and discredited in
recent years by the system’s critics.3
While it now seems that the weight of scholarly analysis goes
against the Electoral College system, the victory for the critics is hollow.
In defiance of the old adage, the critics have shown us why we should
have the will, but have been surprisingly uncreative and defeatist as to
the way to reform the current system.4 The traditional refrain is: The
Electoral College stinks, but we’re stuck with it until a super-majority’s
worth of people catch the smell and push through a constitutional
amendment.5
This Article will focus on one potential way in which Electoral
College reform can be achieved without resort to the cumbersome and
glacially slow process of constitutional amendment. Using a multilateral
[hereinafter Subcommittee Report] (H.J. Res. 28) (discussing a proposed amendment to the
Constitution to “abolish the Electoral College and provide for the direct popular election of the
President and Vice President”); Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and its Meager Federalism,
88 MARQ. L. REV. 195 (2004); Akhil R. Amar, The Electoral College, Unfair From Day One, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at A23; Vikram D. Amar, The 2004 Presidential Election and the Electoral
College: How the Results Debunk Some Defenses of the Current System, FINDLAW, Nov. 12, 2004,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20041112.html [hereinafter Amar, Debunking Defenses].
2. Or, at least, to the compromise that was made at the time of the framing. For these types
of arguments supporting the institution, see HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 163 (asserting that “to
many reformers,” the arguments of would-be reformers simply represent “a convenient fig leaf for
their true agenda: to abolish the Electoral College and undermine the principles of federalism”).
Also, Fuentes-Rohwer and Charles frame the issue of presidential election as a difficult choice in
our attempt to balance competing norms of democracy and federalism. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer &
Guy-Uriel Charles, The Law of Presidential Elections: Issues in the Wake of Florida 2000, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 879, 922 (2001).
3. Amar, Debunking Defenses, supra note 1; Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate:
The Framers, Federalism, and One Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2549 (2001)
[hereinafter Note, Rethinking the Electoral College] (systematically addressing and debunking
various supposed strategic and federalist justifications of the Electoral College and concluding that
“[a]rguments based on the Framers’ federalist visions . . . cannot withstand empirical scrutiny”);
Boudreaux, supra note 1, at 246 (“Today’s electoral mathematics work without any coherence.”).
But see HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 141-60 (systematically deconstructing a number of the more
popular alternative proposals and the logic behind them).
4. Robert Bennett also suggests that, “[t]he way seems reasonably clear to a popular vote for
President if the will is there.” Robert W. Bennett, State Coordination in Popular Election of the
President Without a Constitutional Amendment, 5 GREEN BAG 141, 149 (2002) [hereinafter
Bennett, State Coordination].
5. This assumption is illustrated well in Fuentes-Rohwer & Charles, supra note 2, at 881-82
(“[A]bolishing the College would ultimately necessitate a constitutional amendment, a particularly
onerous and generally difficult exercise . . . .”).
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interstate agreement, a critical mass of states may be able to obviate the
Electoral College system in favor of a national popular vote to decide the
presidency. If a group of states that represents greater than 270 Electoral
College votes were to agree to cast their votes to the winner of the
national popular election, the Electoral College would become
functionally irrelevant to the process of presidential selection.6 While
this idea has been presented previously, until recently it has been done
only in passing, without full consideration of the current legal regime
governing interstate compacts.7 Further, little attention has been given
to the questions of whether and why states would have any interest in
pursuing and honoring such a pact, and how strategic obstacles could be
overcome.
The lack of detailed consideration of the law of interstate
agreements and compacts, vis-à-vis electoral reform, results perhaps
from a general scholarly disinterest in the law of interstate compacts.
This scholarly vacuum may, in turn, exist because the jurisprudence of
the Interstate Compact Clause has demonstrated a surprising lack of
precision, which in turn has begotten a capacious, and perhaps even
cavalier, approach to this field that seems to ignore entirely concerns of
horizontal federalism. This Article will therefore explore if, and how,
6. Of course, it would remain as the procedural, if ceremonial, modality of presidential
selection, and this may be an important and even decisive factor in an external constitutional
challenge to the plan. See infra Part III.
7. The general idea has been presented in Akhil R. Amar & Vikram D. Amar, How to
Achieve Direct National Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution, FINDLAW,
Dec. 28, 2001, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20011228.html [hereinafter Amar & Amar,
Direct National Election]; Bennett, State Coordination, supra note 4; Robert W. Bennett, Popular
Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amendment, 4 GREEN BAG 241, 243-44 (2001).
Since the writing of this Article, a multi-state movement along the lines considered in this Article
has gained momentum, a lengthy book has been published, and both scholarly and news observers
have taken note. See generally JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN
FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE (2006) (proposing interstate compact
method turning on national popular vote); Stanley Chang, Updating the Electoral College: The
National Popular Vote Legislation, 44 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS., 205 (2007) (reviewing the National
Popular Vote proposal, its attempts at legislative reform, and its potential effects upon presidential
political dynamics); Jennings Wilson, Bloc Voting in the Electoral College: How the Ignored States
Can Become Relevant and Implement Popular Election Along the Way, 5 ELEC. LAW JOURNAL 384
(2006) (suggesting bloc voting method whereby states agree to cast vote according to popular vote
of bloc member states); Drop Out of the College, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 2006, at A26 (describing
the Electoral College as an “antidemocratic relic” and praising the efforts of the National Popular
Vote organization). Very recently, the National Popular Vote organization has enjoyed legislative
success. As of May 2007, forty bills inspired by the organization have been introduced in state
legislatures, two bills have passed both state houses, and one bill, that of Maryland, has been signed
by the Governor and entered into law. See http://www.nationalpopularvote.com; George Skelton, In
Voting to End Electoral College, Maryland Dares to Go Where Schwarzenegger Wouldn’t, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at Metro 3.
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the neglected law of interstate agreements might make possible an
ambitious change in electoral politics. 8
Part II treats briefly the background strategic effects and trends of
the current Electoral College system before outlining and detailing the
contours of the proposed interstate compact. While this Article proceeds
largely from the standpoint of an assumption that electoral reform is
desired, a brief treatment of the relevant strategic insights is of
considerable help in understanding the viability of the plan from the
standpoint of political economy and likely congressional response. Part
III reviews the history and shape of the current law surrounding the
Interstate Compact Clause, tracing the major case developments of
recent decades. Part IV considers how the current proposal might
interact with the law and scholarship of interstate agreements,
particularly under the assumption of congressional silence. It also
considers potential legal responses to the plan and the substantial
obstacles, both with respect to enforcement and external challenges.
II. ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE OUTLINE OF A WAY OUT
A. Electoral Morass and Formulaic Chance
Since the passage of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804, there have
been hundreds of attempts to radically change or abolish the Electoral
College system.9 Further, in the wake of the 2000 election, which
produced a “wrong” winner—where the candidate that won the popular
vote loses the election as a consequence of capturing less electoral
votes—and the 2004 election, which threatened to produce another
“wrong” winner, the calls for reform have only intensified.10 Of course,
8. The Constitution states: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. For a brief
discussion of preconstitutional interstate compacts, see PAUL T. HARDY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS:
THE TIES THAT BIND 3-4 (1982); Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional
Consent, 68 MO. L. REV. 285, 296-98 (2003) (discussing the problems regarding interstate compacts
under the Articles of Confederation and framing the Interstate Compact Clause as the obvious and
direct response to such problems). Further, it is at the capacious functional compact regime since
U.S. Steel that Greve levels his penetrating critique. Id. at 377-79; U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978). For the full treatment of this case and the attendant Compact
Clause analysis, see infra Parts II and III.
9. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Mr. Scott of Virginia). The pair of
resolutions printed and discussed in the House report is one such example, and it should be noted
that those resolutions typify the form of the traditional debate, as they are proposals for
constitutional amendment. Id.
10. See Fuentes-Rohwer & Charles, supra note 2, at 879-80 (discussing the possibility of a
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the controversy engendered by divergent, or “wrong” outcomes is not
entirely surprising. It is in these situations that the Electoral College is
most conspicuous, as it is only in this situation that the Electoral College
is unequivocally outcome determinative. While in other cases the
election may be influenced by the strategic dynamics of the system, it is
only in the case of divergence that the Electoral College system clearly
changes the outcome from what the popular vote would have otherwise
dictated. And while popular vote winners have failed to win the
presidential election only four times in American history,11 with the
2000 election burning in recent memory, and the 2004 election a
divergence near-miss,12 the specter of a “wrong winner” looms. In these
conditions, the premises of the arguments in support of the Electoral
College are scrutinized more carefully; inertia of tradition and fear of
change will not carry the day.13 While a complete and detailed analysis
of the Electoral College system is outside the scope of this Article,
insofar as an analysis of the dynamics of Electoral College voting
informs our understanding of the strategic choices facing potential
“wrong winner” and citing DAVID W. ABBOTT & JAMES P. LEVINE, WRONG WINNER: THE COMING
DEBACLE IN THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 1-20 (1991)). Representative LaHood characterized the
phenomenon of divergence as a “potentially huge, looming political crisis.” Subcommittee Report,
supra note 1, at 14. Further, Akhil Amar has questioned whether such a “loser/winner” would “be
seen as legitimate at home and abroad[.]” Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 51. See also
Amar, Debunking Defenses, supra note 1 (arguing that we should not tolerate “any possibility of
electoral ‘inversion’” and using the possibility of a divergence between the popular and the electoral
vote winner as a principal argument against the electoral college system) (emphasis added). In
2001, Harvard Law Review noted that “A Lexis search in the New York Times and Washington
Post databases for articles that feature the term ‘electoral college’ at least three times yields more
articles from September 1, 2000, to April 1, 2001 (169 articles), than from the fifteen years prior to
September 1, 2000 (137 articles).” Note, Rethinking the Electoral College, supra note 3, at 2526
n.3. Interestingly, this trend has only increased. From April 1, 2001, to Jan. 5, 2005, the term
“electoral college” appeared in those two publications a combined 341 times.
11. In the 1824, 1876, 1888, and 2000 elections. Note, Rethinking the Electoral College,
supra note 3, at 2526 n.2.
12. President Bush won both the popular vote and the Electoral College vote. Bush received
50.73% of the popular vote to Kerry’s 48.27%. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 2004 PRESIDENTIAL
POPULAR VOTE SUMMARY (2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/tables.pdf. Bush
prevailed in the Electoral College vote 286 to 251. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 2004 ELECTORAL
VOTE DISTRIBUTION (2004), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/presmaps.pdf. Had
Kerry taken Ohio, he would have won the election, 271 to 266. He lost in Ohio by 118,599 votes.
See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 2004 OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS (2005),
available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/2004pres.pdf. See also Koza, supra note 7 at 16
(noting, if [fifty-nine thousand Bush voters in Ohio had switched in 2004, Kerry would have won
the election).
13. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 51 (statement of Akhil R. Amar) (attacking
“[i]nertial, Burkean arguments”). For an argument that urges wary walking, see BICKEL, supra note
1, at 2-3 (urging that “political reformers must in any case proceed with caution,” and that there are
“great virtues in a conservative attitude towards structural features of government”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 4
SCHLEIFERFINAL.DOC

722

5/14/2007 12:49:10 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:717

parties to our interstate compact, such analysis is both useful and
necessary.
Civics class wisdom has it that the Electoral College system
expresses values of federalism by encouraging candidates to vie for
small states because those states are disproportionately represented by
virtue of the two votes that each state receives under the Senate add-on
feature of the Electoral College.14 Yet, modern analysis shows that the
“significant but largely unpredictable large-state advantage in the
winner-take-all feature of the electoral college [sic] . . . generally
dominates the [small-state] Senate add-on bias.”15 Under the regime of
winner-take-all, an individual voter in a large state has the ability to
control more electoral votes than a corresponding voter in a small state,
and thus exerts more electoral power.16 One therefore observes a
number of electoral dynamics in tension with one another. Any search
for decisiveness or certainty with regards to systemic advantages and
disadvantages will demonstrate that the one clear insight is that nothing
is clear or certain.17
Yet, irrespective of the systematic effects of the current system visà-vis large or small states, rural or urban states, labor votes, Blacks,
Jews, Italians, suburban shoppers, or metrosexuals,18 one thing is clear:
Unit voting, in which the margin of victory in a given state is irrelevant,
discourages, if not prevents, candidates from collecting votes in clearly
sympathetic states and from combating large deficits in hostile states.19
These incentives guarantee that it is far better to be a swing state than a
14. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Rep. Hyde) (“The notion of an
arithmetic winner . . . strikes at the very heart of the compromises that put this country together back
in 1789 and 1787.”).
15. Note, Rethinking the Electoral College, supra note 3, at 2537-38.
16. See generally John F. Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the
Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304 (1968) (demonstrating how a single voter from a large state
has a far greater chance of affecting the outcome). See also Koza, supra note 7, at 22. (“[T]he twovote bonus established by the Constitution to enhance the influence of the small states exists today
in form; however, the nearly unanimous use by the states of the winner-take-all rule robs these
bonus electoral votes of any political substance.” This view has not enjoyed unequivocal support,
though, and recent elections may make the situation murkier. See Boudreaux, supra note 1, at 221
(“Recent history, moreover, has not been kind to the assumption that the Electoral College aids
voters in large states.”).
17. See HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 142 (noting that any proposal based “perceived”
advantages “to one group or another” is problematic because “demographics and political views
change over time”).
18. These are some of the demographics isolated for example in Boudreaux, supra note 1, at
227, and HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 142. See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, The Politics of the
Rural Vote, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 743 (2003) (analyzing the politics and political economy of the rural
vote and concluding that “rural dwellers have disproportionately little political voice”).
19. See Boudreaux, supra note 1, at 226-27.
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state that is not “in play.”20 Large but non-competitive states such as
California, Texas, New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts are thus
underserved relative to large but competitive states such as Florida,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin.21 While it is these larger
swing states that inspire the most attention, it should be clear that the
same logic should obtain for smaller states: Nevada will attract more
attention than Idaho, Arkansas more attention than Mississippi. And
insofar as the needs and interests of voters in competitive states are
considered and addressed more completely than those in noncompetitive states—an eminently reasonable assumption—we can begin
to understand why the numerous non-swing states on both sides of the
political divide might consider an alternative regime.
Before turning to the details of one such alternative, it is necessary
to highlight one other important dynamic that currently obtains in
presidential politics. Not only has divergence been a worrisome
possibility,22 but it has been quite unclear (both before and after the
election!) which candidate would benefit from such divergence.23 While
Democrats were able to vilify the system which gave them the popular
vote but not the presidency in 2000, it could have quite easily been the
Republicans sounding the same refrain. Further, this pervasive
uncertainty will continue as long as the relative presidential political
parity between the two parties continues, and as long as our choice for
President is the product of “formulaic chance.”24
The above analysis demonstrates that there is no way for any state
20. See id. (noting that this dynamic “may result in neglect” of non-competitive states); Note,
Rethinking the Electoral College, supra note 3, at 2544 (noting that while the electoral college
encourages candidates to visit small swing states, it also “encourages them to ignore entire regions
that one party controls, such as the Republican-dominated Deep South, Great Plains, and mountain
states in the 2000 election”) (citing Simendinger et al., Pondering a Popular Vote, 32 NAT’L J.
3650, 3653 (2000), for a breakdown of candidate campaign efforts).
21. See Boudreaux, supra note 1, at 226-27 (“[C]itizens in states with a strong leaning to one
candidate . . . may find that the nominees give them little attention during the campaign.”); Dotty
Lynch, Don’t Look Back, CBS News, Apr. 12, 2001, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2001/04/12/politics/main285366.shtml (“What convoluted system caused Bush and Gore to
virtually ignore the voters in four of the six most populous states – California, Texas, New York and
Illinois – and spend so much time and money in Washington and Wisconsin?”). This distortion is
also evidenced by the disparate sums of money spent in “battleground states.” “[O]f the %237
million spent on advertising during the last month of the Presidential campaign, 72% was spent in
five states (Florida, Ohio, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania.” Chang, supra note 7, at 218 (citing
Koza, supra note 7, at 9-10).
22. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
23. See Note, Rethinking the Electoral College, supra note 3, at 2540-41 (noting that Al Gore
could just have easily won the Electoral College while losing the popular vote); Amar, Debunking
Defenses, supra note 1 (noting the same for the 2004 election).
24. Boudreaux, supra note 1, at 196.
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or any group of states to know whether they benefit systematically from
the Electoral College system. This is important, because this uncertainty
may very well be the strategic precondition for any broad-based bipartisan interstate agreement. To see why this is so, an example may
help. If Texas were disaffected with its comfortable and irrelevant place
in the electoral pockets of the Republican Party,25 and committed to cast
its votes with the winner of the popular election, it would presumably
boost its relevance by putting its considerable population as a numerator
in the entire national denominator. Yet, it would realize that, most
likely, the only case in which this scheme would affect the outcome of
the election is where there is indeed a divergence between the popular
and electoral winner.26 In such an instance, if the Republican candidate
were the popular vote leader and the Electoral College loser, Texas
would do nothing differently—it would cast its votes for the Republican
candidate, as it would have done anyway, though it would do so while
watching Democratic-party states (identically bound) grudgingly give
their electoral votes to Texas’s favored candidate. But if the inverse
outcome occurred, and the Democratic candidate won the popular vote
but trailed in the electoral vote,27 Texas would be forced to commit its
votes to its disfavored candidate and thereby decide the election against
its substantive preference. If we presume that substantive outcome
trumps the niceties of platform reform as a matter of state strategy, we
might expect that the chance of such a loss by a state’s own hand would
bar agreement. But in conditions of uncertainty, where it is quite
unclear to whose benefit a divergence would inure, we might expect the
likelihood of both divergence outcomes to cancel one another out,
leaving only issues of campaign and platform reform as motivating
concerns.
At this point one might ask: if a state wants to “put itself in play,”
why would it not unilaterally move to distribute its electoral votes by
district, eschewing the all-or-nothing approach for a proportional
system?28 After all, wouldn’t this be the path of least resistance in
making candidates fight for one’s proxied interests? It seems the
25. Texas has voted for the Republican candidate in eight of the last nine presidential
contests. See Kelvin Pollard, Presidential Elections: Swing States and Bellwethers, Population
Reference Bureau, PRB, Oct. 2004, http://www.prb.org/Template.cfm?Section=PRB&template=/
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=11708.
26. This is apart from the general, diffuse effect that the change in electoral tactics might have
on the election as a whole.
27. As occurred in the 2000 election.
28. Nebraska and Maine, for example, already employ district voting, and Colorado has also
considered such a change. See Pollard, supra note 25.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss4/4

8

Schleifer: Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform
SCHLEIFERFINAL.DOC

2007]

5/14/2007 12:49:10 PM

INTERSTATE AGREEMENT FOR ELECTORAL REFORM

725

obstacles to such a move are two-fold. First, this may be akin to
unilateral disarmament, asking a state to reduce its overall clout vis-à-vis
other states.29 Further, the governing majority of each state may not
want to reduce its control of the entirety of the state’s votes:30 Why
would Texas Republicans wish to transfer a significant portion of the
electoral votes they currently control directly to the Democratic Party?
It seems far more likely that they would be willing to risk this
proposition in the case of divergence than that they would be willing to
cede the votes as a matter of certainty. This is all the more likely if they
can count on states with inverted preferences being similarly bound.
B. Contours of the Plan
Because we have just considered why states might be willing to
cede their Electoral College votes in favor of an interstate agreement, we
can now consider the mechanics of such an agreement. Since any good
plan needs a serviceable name and acronym, the plan can be termed the
Electoral College Reform Agreement (ECRA). The predicate legislation
of the interstate agreement could be, following the suggestion of Akhil
and Vikram Amar:31
This state shall choose a slate of electors [for election of the President
that is] loyal to the Presidential candidate who wins the national
popular vote, if and only if other states, whose electors taken together
with this state’s electors total at least 270, also enact [to do the same,
though this state will not be bound unless at least 100 of the initial 270
electoral votes represent states whose electoral votes went to a
candidate other than the one chosen by this state in the prior
election.]32

This legislation addresses two likely concerns of potential parties.
It ensures that a state will sacrifice its block vote clout and pre-commit
its votes in a way that risks giving the election to a disfavored candidate
in favor of the national popular election only when 1) enough states have
also joined so as to make the popular vote generally determinative, and
2) there is no particular party or candidate to whom the benefit of
divergence is perceived as likely to repeatedly inure.
29. Amar & Amar, Direct National Election, supra note 7.
30. Further, statewide political power may not mirror the presidential choice of a given state.
31. Amar & Amar, Direct National Election, supra note 7.
32. Id. See Bennett, State Coordination, supra note 4, at 147 (discussing concerns regarding
political balance in contingent legislation). While I put the bipartisan figure at 100/270 here, it
could probably go as high as 120 electoral votes. See infra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text.
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While a number of permutations of potential state parties are
possible, it seems safe to say that a coalition of eighteen states, seven of
which traditionally favor the Democratic presidential candidate, and
eleven of which traditionally favor the Republican, comprising 274
electoral votes could be established, and one such plausible grouping
will form the basis of my assumption.33 The states in this proposed plan
are all states whose presidential politics are particularly stable.34 There
are no bellwether or battleground states that stand to lose much in the
way of political influence and attention from the interstate agreement, an
agreement that would obviate the disproportionate attention currently
lavished upon such states by virtue of their current strategic significance.
Further, many of the suggested potential states party to this
agreement are middle-sized states. While the Senate add-on and the allor-nothing effects tend to advantage both big and small states (even if in
sometimes unpredictable ways),35 it seems that middle-sized states
benefit from neither distortion.36 Accordingly, these states should be
particularly receptive to the idea of multilateral reform.
Before approaching the question of whether such an agreement
requires consent under Article I, section 10 of the Constitution,37 a few
points should be addressed. First, no consideration has been given to
whether the proposal would be for just one presidential cycle or whether
it would be indefinite in length. Though a state might be willing to precommit itself to one election cycle, it might be more hesitant to commit
indefinitely. Because the length of the commitment may affect (and be
bound up with) the legal status of the agreement and its treatment under
the Compact Clause, we will consider this question more fully below.
Two logistical issues remain as well: faithless electors and the
actual tally of the national popular vote. Taking up the issue of faithless
33. I envision CA (55); NY (31); IL (21); MA (12); WA (11) MN(10); HI (4) as the
“Democratic” states, totaling 144 votes, and TX (34); GA (15); NC (15); VA (13); IA (11); AL (9);
SC (8); OK (7); KS (7); MS (6); UT (5) comprising the “Republican” states, totaling 130. This
would, of course, yield 18 states and 274 votes. For speculations on potential reformer states in the
context of bloc voting proposal, see Wilson, supra note 7 at 400-01.
34. See Pollard, supra note 25 (cataloguing the electoral histories of various states in six
recent presidential elections and describing which states are stable and secure for the respective
political parties).
35. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
36. See Bennett, State Coordination, supra note 4, at 143 (“The states disfavored by the
combination of the two-Senator bonus and the winner-take-all effect are found in the middle of the
population spectrum.”).
37. See infra Part III-IV. Both Amar & Amar and Bennett are optimistic that congressional
consent is not required. See Amar & Amar, Direct National Election, supra note 7; Bennett, State
Coordination, supra note 4, at 146.
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electors first, it should be noted that faithless electors are no more a
danger here than they are in the current regime. In both instances
electors refuse to vote for that candidate to whom they are pledged.
Further, faithless electors have been far more a paper tiger than anything
else, as there have been only a handful of such electors in recent
history,38 and many states have laws prohibiting faithless electors.39
With respect to the actual tally of the national vote, there is
legitimate concern regarding both overall accuracy and the potential for
obstruction by disaffected states not party to the agreement. Currently,
the tally of each state’s popular vote is left to the state itself, which then
submits the total to the archivist of the United States as part of the state’s
certificate of ascertainment.40 Presumably, states could dispense with
the popular vote as a means of choosing electors. And while even the
most irate non-party state would likely prefer to keep its nose than to cut
it off to spite the interstate electoral reformers, the possibility remains
nonetheless.41
One method for eliminating dependence on potentially inept or
recalcitrant state officials would be to set up an interstate electoral
commission of some kind. Yet, the construction of an interstate
commission or agency would of course leave non-party states outside its
ambit, meaning that only the popular vote of the states which are parties
38. HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 50 (only seven of the 17,397 votes cast by electors between
1820 and 1980 have been cast against the choice of the elector’s party). Interestingly, a Minnesota
elector pledged to Kerry actually voted for John Edwards in the 2004 election. See Timothy Noah,
Against Secret Ballots: Who Was Minnesota’s Faithless Elector?, SLATE, Dec. 14, 2004,
http://slate.msn.com/id/2111077/. Because the ballot is secret in Minnesota and no elector admitted
to voting for Edwards, the identity and motivation behind this vote is currently unknown. Id. Yet,
Edwards received all ten elector votes for Vice President as well, making it appear as though the
vote for Edwards on the presidential ticket might have been a mistake. Id.
39. Boudreaux, supra note 1, at 210 n.105, 106. In the case of Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,
228-31 (1952), the Court held that a political party can require its elector to take a pledge to support
that party’s candidate. Though the Court did not reach the question of whether laws punishing
faithless electors are constitutional, it seems that this is assumed, though even in this case, the
deterrent effect could not, per se, force the elector to honor her pledge. HARDAWAY, supra note 1,
at 53. Perhaps the danger in this situation is that the faithless elector would put the state in breach
of its potential obligation vis-à-vis the other states party to the agreement. Insofar as this is a
concern, then the analysis would track the general enforcement concerns considered in Part III and
Part IV.
40. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1948) (providing that it is the duty of the executive of each State to submit
the apportionment of electors pursuant to state law to the archivist of the United States); Bennett,
State Coordination, supra note 4, at 147.
41. See Amar & Amar, Direct National Election, supra note 7 (discussing this remote
possibility). The authors here respond to such a possibility by tendering a proposal for independent
criteria for determining the national popular vote though an interstate commission. Id. The
possibility that a state on the losing side of a divergence might be given incentive to manipulate its
vote tally also exists, though of course seems similarly unlikely.
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could be calculated. First, this would mean that the referent vote tally
would become the “popular vote of the states party to this agreement”
rather than the overall national vote. Further, because this solution
would alter the strategic calculus for the party states,42 it might cause the
entire agreement to become unstable. Lastly, a national commission
might again impact the legal analysis of the agreement under Compact
Clause jurisprudence, a point to which we will turn below. It is
therefore likely that any interstate agreement would have to overcome
considerable challenges of administration and implementation.
Apart from the logistical concerns are the legal questions raised by
ECRA. For ECRA to be viable, it must be situated within the existing
regime of interstate agreements, have a reasonable likelihood of
enforceability, and survive external constitutional challenges. These
considerations are discussed below.
III. COMPACT CLAUSE HISTORY AND CURRENT POSTURE
In this Part, we will consider the history and current landscape of
interstate compact jurisprudence. We will consider three landmark cases
and analyze the current functional regime of vertical federalism analysis.
Interestingly, while the constitutional law of interstate agreements seems
in some tension with both constitutional text and insights of horizontal
federalism, these weaknesses may be strengths with respect to ECRA.
A. Compact History
The use and analysis of interstate agreements and compacts predate
the Constitution.43 The Articles of Confederation provide, “No two or
more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance
whatever between them, without the consent of the United States in
Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the
same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.”44 There was
much disunity under this regime and many controversies arose regarding
boundary disputes, agreements with Indian tribes, and agreements
between states without the consent of the Congress.45 The framers of the
Constitution sought to impose more uniformity in this regard.46 The
42. Presumably, either the Democratic or Republican leaning states would have a numerical
advantage in this instance.
43. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI
44. Id.
45. Greve, supra note 8, at 297.
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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Constitution therefore precludes states completely from entering into any
treaties, alliances, and federations,47 and provides that “[n]o state shall,
without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State . . . .”48 Thus, we have two forms of
prohibition with respect to state agreements:49 There is an absolute
prohibition on treaties, alliances, and federations, and a qualified
prohibition on agreements and compacts.
An important effort to fill in this dichotomy came with Justice
Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.50 There,
Justice Story speculated that the absolute prohibition applied to treaties
“of a political character,” while the qualified prohibition applied to
agreements involving the exercise of “mere private rights of
sovereignty.”51 Further, Story asserted that the congressional consent
requirement for the latter category would “check any infringement of the
rights of the national government.”52 In his taxonomy, Story was overinclusive with respect to both categories. He included treaties of cession
in the category of absolute prohibition, and interstate boundary
settlements within the qualified prohibition, despite ample contemporary
evidence of state practice to the contrary.53 This said, Story made no
pretense of historical support for his claim, and admitted that his analysis
was the result of speculation.54 Ironically, not fifty years prior, James
Madison, writing for Publius, made the only mention of the Interstate
Compact Clause in the Federalist Papers, dispatching with any detailed
analysis and stating that the reasons for the clause are “either so obvious,
or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without
remark.”55 It was this supposed obviousness that has cast an air of
uncertainty over all subsequent analysis.

47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
49. I use “agreements” here, as I do throughout, in its non-technical, constitutionally neutral
form.
50. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1397
(1st ed. 1833) (in subsequent editions § 1403).
51. Id.; See also David E. Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Agreements: When is a
Compact Not a Compact, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63, 65 (1965) (discussing Story’s commentaries);
Greve, supra note 8, at 299 (same).
52. Story, supra note 50; Engdahl, supra note 51, at 65. Though developed in further detail
infra, it should be noted that this analysis focuses on the vertical relationship between party states
and the national government, while ignoring the horizontal relationship between party states and
states not party to the agreement.
53. Engdahl, supra note 51, at 65-66.
54. Id. at 65.
55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 281 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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This dichotomy between the absolute and conditional prohibitions
in Article I § 10 is neither the focus of this analysis nor of modern
Compact Clause jurisprudence. What is the essential focus of both is the
dichotomy between those agreements that require congressional consent
and those that do not. And while Justice Story’s analysis seems largely
irrelevant to this question as an analytical matter, as a historical matter,
Justice Story’s analysis is a crucial point of departure. To understand
how, “[i]n a curious feat of judicial doubletalk, Story’s distinction
between ‘treaties’ and ‘agreements or compacts’ was applied to the new
task of exempting all but a narrow class of ‘agreements or compacts’
from the requirement of congressional consent,”56 one must examine the
case of Virginia v. Tennessee.57
B. Virginia v. Tennessee: Meta Historical Analysis
In Virginia v. Tennessee, the two states were involved in a
boundary dispute and Virginia challenged the existing agreement
between them as violative of the Interstate Compact Clause on the
theory that the requirement of congressional consent was unmet.58 The
Court noted that the language of Article I § 10 is so general and
capacious as to “embrace all forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and
relating to all kinds of subjects[,]”59 and thus sought to distinguish
agreements “to those which the United States can have no possible
objection or have any interest in interfering with,” from those that “may
tend to increase . . . the political influence of the contracting states, so as
to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States . . . .”60
Over the next two pages of the U.S. Reports, the Court considered this
distinction and its import with help from Story’s Commentaries.61
Specifically, the Court pointed out that Story himself noted that
consent “may be properly required, in order to check any infringement
of the rights of the national government; and, at the same time, a total
prohibition to enter into any compact or agreement might be attended
with permanent inconvenience or public mischief.”62
It seems that this comment by Story is susceptible to two readings.
First, it might be considered a defense and justification of the
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Engdahl, supra note 51, at 66.
148 U.S. 503 (1893).
Id. at 504.
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id. at 519-20.
Id. at 519-20 (quoting Story, supra note 50).
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straightforward, inflexible rule requiring congressional consent. Story
might be saying that this regime balances the need for control with that
of efficiency by allowing for agreements only to which Congress
consents. This is the most reasonable interpretation of this text.
Under an alternative reading, Story is implying that consent is good
in some places, for some reasons, but onerous and unnecessary in others.
While it is unclear which meaning the Court assumes in its quotation, it
immediately follows this quote by announcing a new functional
Compact Clause regime.63 Thus, whether the Court took the second
reading of Story’s comments as authority, or whether it was simply
casting about for justification, it precedes and follows its analysis of
Story’s Commentaries by stating that congressional consent is required
only where such agreement may increase “the political power or
influence of the states affected, and thus encroach . . . upon the full and
free exercise of federal authority”64 and/or the “just supremacy of the
United States.”65 Interestingly enough, this entire analysis is actually
dictum, as the Court held that congressional consent had been implied in
this case.66
Far more importantly, especially for our purposes, is that this
analysis may unduly ignore the horizontal aspect of functional
federalism analysis.67 The Court here seems to ask whether the power of
the states is altered, but only as a proxy for how the states are affected in
their relationship to the federal government. While Greve assumes that
this devaluation of horizontal federalism arose simply as an accident of
the facts of this case,68 the Court itself may have been more circumspect.
It speculated that if the political power of one of the states was
noticeably enlarged in the settlement of a new boundary line, consent of
Congress might be required.69 Whether the Court here assumed that an
enlarged state could be problematic because it will have altered its
vertical relationship with the United States, or (also) because the
aggrandizement of one state comes at the expense of another— an issue

63. Greve, supra note 8, at 299, notes Story himself could not have favored a Compact Clause
“with holes,” if his concurrence in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 572 (1840), is to be
believed.
64. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 520.
65. Id. at 519.
66. Greve, supra note 8, at 300-01; Engdahl, supra note 51, at 67. Though, as mentioned in
these sources and as we will see below, this dictum has become an authoritative holding.
67. See Greve, supra note 8, at 301 (discussing and distinguishing horizontal and vertical
federalism).
68. Id.
69. Virginia, 148 U.S. at 520.
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of horizontal federalism,—is not totally clear from the opinion itself, but
it is important to our evaluation of our interstate agreement, since ECRA
could create changes in the relative influence of both member and nonmember states..70
C. U.S. Steel: Enshrinement of Vertical Federalism Analysis and End of
Consent
The next landmark case relevant to our inquiry converted the
dictum of Virginia v. Tennessee into a constitutional holding. U.S. Steel
v. Multistate Tax Commission71 arose as a class action challenge to the
Multistate Tax Compact. The compact, which languished in committee
before ultimately dying without congressional consent, established a
standing Multistate Tax Commission with regulatory and judicial
authority to determine rules for evaluating tax obligations and arbitration
for settlement of disputes.72 This said, the compact permitted, in Article
X, parties to withdraw by enacting a repealing statute—absent such
provision, states are prevented from withdrawing unilaterally from an
interstate compact.73 Further, the pact did not authorize the member
states to do anything they could not otherwise do in its absence.74
Urged by Appellants to abandon the Virginia v. Tennessee rule that
became a holding in New Hampshire v. Maine one year prior,75 the
Court again affirmed its functional approach and refused to return to a
literal reading to the Compact Clause, stating, “[W]e are reluctant to
accept this invitation to circumscribe modes of interstate cooperation
that do not enhance state power to the detriment of federal supremacy.”76
Following this statement, the Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the
history and meta-history of the Compact Clause.77 Interestingly, the
Court noted that Justice Field’s analysis in Virginia v. Tennessee was

70.
71.
72.
73.

See infra Parts III and IV.
434 U.S. 452 (1978).
Greve, supra note 8, at 302-04.
MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT: SUGGESTED STATE
LEGISLATION AND ENABLING ACT art. X, at 10 (1966), available at http://www.mtc.gov/
uploadedFiles/Multistate_Tax_Commission/About_MTC/MTC_Compact/COMPACT(1).pdf;
Hardy, supra note 8, at 3 (describing contractual nature of compacts and their binding nature).
74. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473. Though we will revisit this point infra, Justice White’s
dissent should be noted. He pointed out: “The Clause must mean that some actions which would be
permissible for individual States to undertake are not permissible for a group of States to agree to
undertake.” Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
75. 426 U.S. 363 (1976).
76. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 460.
77. See id. at 459-72.
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dictum and also noted how he misread Story’s text to come to his
conclusion.78 Yet, the Court nonetheless confirmed the functional test set
out by Justice Field, and in so doing indicated unmistakably that it is
vertical, and not horizontal issues of state power that are relevant to the
inquiry regarding consent: “[T]he test is whether the Compact enhances
state power quoad the National Government.”79 And if there were any
doubts about this vertical orientation, they might have been extinguished
later in the opinion when the Court rejected Appellants’ argument that
the “Compact exerts undue pressure to join upon nonmember States”
and that the coordination of member states will “redound to [their]
benefit,” stating that “[a]ny time a State adopts a fiscal or administrative
policy that affects the programs of a sister State, pressure to modify
those programs may result.”80 It seems the Court considered federal
statute and preemption the proper way to confront the issue of horizontal
competition.81
Before moving on to the last major case of our Compact Clause
trilogy, it serves to make two more points. In his dissent, Justice White
highlighted an aspect of the compact that troubled him and distinguished
the compact, in his mind, from traditional reciprocal legislation.82 He
noted:
The Compact did not become effective in any of the ratifying States
until at least seven States had adopted it. Thus, unlike reciprocal
legislation, the Compact provided a means by which a State could
assure itself that a certain number of other States would go along
before committing itself to an apportionment formula.83

The ability to coordinate state action strategically in this sort of
conditional pre-commitment scheme was, for Justice White, an
important distinguishing feature from generic reciprocal legislation.
And while this point was made in dissent, it is worth noting in
connection with ECRA, which provides just such a conditional
mechanism.
Lastly, to contextualize the holding of U.S. Steel in relation to the
78. Id. at 467.
79. Id. at 473.
80. Id. at 477-78. To this argument, Greve, supra note 8, at 305, says: “[S]o what? Those
other state policies are not constitutionally disfavored. State compacts are.”
81. The dissent argued that congressional consideration is important in order to consider
whether a given agreement is “likely to disadvantage other States to an important extent . . . .” U.S.
Steel, 434 U.S. at 485.
82. Id. at 493.
83. Id.
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broader issue of congressional consent, it should be noted that, since
Virginia v. Tennessee, “it appears that no court has ever voided a state
agreement for failure to obtain congressional assent.”84 U.S. Steel only
ratifies and reinforces this trend.
D. Cuyler v. Adams: Congress, Federal Law and Enforcement
The last case in the trilogy is Cuyler v. Adams.85 This case deals
not with congressional consent, but instead with the question of when an
interstate agreement becomes federal law, and when the nature and
substance of the obligations binding upon party states are legal questions
of federal construction.86 The case involved the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, a compact among forty-eight states that permitted temporary
transfer of prisoners for the purpose of facing criminal charges across
jurisdictions.87 While the Pennsylvania court held that state prisoners
transferred under the agreement have no constitutional right to a pretransfer hearing, the federal appellate court held that it was not bound by
the state court’s holding, as the compact was approved by Congress and
thereby “a federal law subject to federal rather than state construction.”88
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, while the agreement did not
require consent under the Compact Clause pursuant to U.S. Steel,
“where Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative
agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an
appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of
Congress transforms the States’ agreement into federal law under the
Compact Clause.”89
While U.S. Steel reduced the class of agreements that Congress
must authorize to pass muster under the Compact Clause, Cuyler
expanded the class of agreements that, by grant of congressional
consent, becomes federal law, the interpretation of which creates a
federal question reviewable by federal courts, contradictory state law
and judicial interpretations notwithstanding. Cuyler therefore has an
inverse effect from U.S. Steel: Rather than place more agreements
outside of the compact regime of Article I § 10, it instead brings in
84. See Greve, supra note 8, at 289 and n.15.
85. 449 U.S. 433 (1981).
86. Id. at 438.
87. Note, Charting No Man’s Land: Applying Jurisdictional and Choice of Law Doctrines to
Interstate Compacts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 1999 (1998) [hereinafter Note, Charting No Man’s
Land].
88. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438.
89. Id. at 440.
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agreements that would otherwise remain outside, at least for purposes of
interpretation and enforcement.
It may be analytically useful to consider and differentiate U.S. Steel
and Cuyler in terms of benefits and burdens. U.S. Steel establishes that
only agreements which threaten federal supremacy must overcome the
burden of congressional consent.90 Cuyler establishes that certain
agreements, though free of that burden, can become federal law, subject
to interpretation and enforcement in federal courts if Congress has given
its consent.91 This can be viewed as an important benefit conferred upon
an agreement insofar as the parties would look to the federal system as
the only place for neutral interpretation and enforcement.92 Prior to
Cuyler, an interstate agreement for which states sought and received
consent could be considered solely a matter of state law, outside the
scope of federal jurisdiction, if the court found that the consent given
was unnecessary.93 After Cuyler, the first step of the analysis shifts from
the properties of the agreement itself to the mere fact of congressional
consent. 94
Yet, the language in Culyer also suggests an important and
potentially thorny limitation on Congress’s ability to transform what
would otherwise be state law agreements into federal law compacts. The
Court held that state law is transformed where there is a state agreement
and the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for
congressional legislation.95 This language suggests that it is not consent
90. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1978).
91. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440-42.
92. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent in Cuyler, characterized the majority’s opinion
as “a remarkable feat of judicial alchemy” that “transform[ed] state law into federal law” by holding
that an “enactment of the Pennsylvania Legislature, for which the consent of Congress was not
required under the Constitution, and to which Congress never consented at all save in the vaguest
terms some 25 years prior to its passage, presents a federal question.” Id. at 450 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Further, he remarked that “the Court’s opinion threatens to become a judicial Midas
meandering through the state statute books, turning everything it touches into federal law.” Id. at
454.
93. See id. at 452-53.
94. It had been well-established that interstate compacts that fall under the Compact Clause
and that have been consented to by Congress, operate as federal law. Yet, this is not to say that in
each of these cases, congressional consent was a prerequisite. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Commission, 359 U.S. 275, 279 (1959) (stating explicitly that agreement between states, “because
made by different States acting under the Constitution and with congressional approval, is a
question of federal law”); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518,
566 (1851) (“This compact, by the sanction of Congress, has become a law of the Union.”). See
also TRIBE, supra note 90, § 6-35, at 1241; L. Mark Eichorn, Cuyler v. Adams and the
Characterization of Compact Law, 77 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1403-05 (1991) (discussing “Law of the
Union Doctrine”); Note, Charting No Man’s Land, supra note 87, at 1998-99.
95. Id. at 440 (majority opinion).
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simpliciter that transforms state into federal law—the consent must be
for an agreement whose subject matter is otherwise appropriate under
federal law. Of course, this limitation may cabin the ability of Congress
to place its Midas touch96 of federal law on certain agreements where the
federal interest is in no way implicated. Perhaps it was with this concern
that the Court added that limiting clause. While this may have been the
Court’s intention, it seems that this limiting clause regarding the subject
matter of the agreement may be symptomatic of a conflation of
competing ideas and values, unhelpful in addressing the functional
concerns that otherwise motivate and dominate Compact Clause
jurisprudence.
The questions of whether consent is required and whether a
compact is federal law under the Law of the Union Doctrine97 involve
differing concerns and aim at different ends. The question of consent is
one, as we have seen in our analysis of U.S. Steel and Virginia, of
national power and interest—does the compact threaten federal
supremacy?98 If not, the United States will permit the states to negotiate
and compact with one another without congressional supervision. The
issue of whether such agreements are themselves federal law, on the
other hand, is addressed to the need for enforceable agreements, and is
driven largely by the functional concerns expressed in Dyer v. Sims
regarding the need for neutral arbiters in conflicts between states.99
Where Congress has consented to the compact, this concern is met by
stressing the fact of congressional consent and highlighting its legislative
form, which allows an easy transition, under the Law of the Union
Doctrine, to the claim that an interstate compact is, in virtue of that
consent, federal law.100
The tension that arises—the tension with which the Cuyler Court
must then grapple—is how to reconcile the fact that some compacts
don’t require consent, while holding that this same consent is important
to enforceability. Because the Court has assumed that agreements that
fall under the U.S. Steel category of no consent are constitutional, but are
not themselves compacts, the qualifying clause in Cuyler seemed
important.
After all, if the subject matter is appropriate for

96. Id. at 454 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (worrying that the “Court’s opinion threatens to
become a judicial Midas meandering through the state statute books, turning everything it touches
into federal law”).
97. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
98. See supra Parts III.B-C.
99. See infra Part IV; Sims, 341 U.S. at 28.
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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congressional legislation, couldn’t Congress have just passed a law
anyway? Yet, if what Congress is doing is simply legislating in an area
that it otherwise could, and the agreement itself is not, strictly speaking,
a compact under the Constitution, then congressional consent seems like
just run-of-the mill legislation and it is unclear why it “transforms the
States’ agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.”101
Without the “appropriate subject matter” qualification though, a
more useful notion emerges. That is, congressional consent operates to
transform any and all interstate agreements into interstate compacts, at
least for purposes of federal enforcement under federal law. But this is
essentially to say that: we like X agreement which, because it does not
enhance state power quoad the national government, is not an interstate
compact under the Constitution, but because we have pronounced that
we like it,102 registered our approval, it has now become a compact
under that same clause. Understandably, the dissent in Cuyler found
this doubletalk quite odd.103 An alternative framing would be: some
agreements don’t require congressional consent because they don’t
threaten to rework our federal system or do violence to its balance of
power— those agreements are not compacts inasmuch as they do not
require congressional consent, but they are compacts inasmuch as they
are agreements between states which cannot be subject to unilateral,
self-judging interpretation and construction by the states parties—
whether or not congress has acted.104 This last step requires a more
frank admission that the Court has, for over a century, really been saying
not that interstate agreements (such as the one in U.S. Steel) are not
compacts under the Compact Clause, but instead that such agreements
are compacts that do not require consent. Though this would turn a
creative gloss into a near-contravention, it would seem a more frank
analysis that would allow the Court to better meet the functional
demands that motivate and currently organize the field.
Of course, one might reasonably think that congressional consent
doesn’t magically convert agreements into compacts, or state law into
federal law under the Compact Clause, while still thinking that where
consent obtains, the agreement should be honored and enforced as
101. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
102. “Congress does not pass upon a submitted compact in the manner of a court of law
deciding a question of constitutionality. Rather, the requirement [of consent is meant] to obtain its
political judgment.” Id. at 440 n.8 (quoting U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 485
(1978) (White, J., dissenting)). It is possible that Justice White’s analysis of submitted compacts
and/or explicit approval may be different in key respects than situations of implied consent.
103. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 451-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. See Sims, 341 U.S. at 28.
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federal law—this may be the best reading of Cuyler itself. This is not to
say that agreements that neither need nor receive congressional consent
are somehow magically converted to federal law. Yet, if we accept the
magic of the first proposition, it may not be so disturbing to accept the
second.
Such a change would have an important effect on ECRA. While
Cuyler has a profound effect on the law of compacts that do not require
the congressional consent they in fact receive, it does not deal directly
with the questions of if, when, and how agreements which neither need
nor receive consent might be enforced in federal court.105 Indeed, it
seems that such agreements would not be considered federal law under
Cuyler. It is this sort of enforceability that the potential states party to
ECRA may very well seek as a precursor for entry into the agreement.
If Cuyler were extended and the alternative framing above was to be
adopted, ECRA would be a substantially more attractive proposition to
the States.
IV. APPLYING ECRA TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT REGIME
This Part will now consider various ways in which ECRA can be
harmonized with the current law of interstate compacts and agreements.
While there is more than one potential collision of the agreement with
current law, this Part will treat just a few of the possibilities. Because
the question of enforcement will loom large for all potential parties, we
must determine whether and how the plan could be enforced by the
federal judiciary, especially in the event that congressional consent is
lacking and/or found legally unnecessary.106 The prevailing U.S. Steel
functional analysis regime indicates that congressional consent will not
be required. Further, a similarly functional analysis employed by the
Cuyler majority, and endorsed in the current literature, may allow the
interstate agreement to be cast as a federal question involving federal or
even quasi-federal law.107
105. Courts have enforced the Cuyler rule without expanding it as far as the alternative framing
suggests. Where a compact fails to meet the consent and subject matter consents, state law has been
held to govern. Note, No Man’s Land, supra note 87, at 2001.
106. The departure point in this analysis is Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981), though, as
is discussed in detail supra Part III, there congressional consent was given, though it was found
unnecessary. Id. at 440-42.
107. In cases where the states themselves sue one another directly, jurisdiction would arise
under U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.2. There is also indication that the law applicable to interstate
disputes more generally is federal common law. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co, 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (holding that the question of apportionment of contested water rights
between states is a question of federal common law upon which “neither the statutes nor the
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I will also address some of the potential external constitutional
challenges to the constitutionality of ECRA relating to the
(im)permissibility of obviating the Electoral College.108
A. Consent and U.S. Steel
Because the courts have not invalidated an interstate agreement for
want of consent in more than a century,109 it seems likely—Justice
White’s dissent in U.S. Steel notwithstanding—that ECRA, if
challenged, would not be considered within the ambit of the Compact
Clause.110 On a functional vertical analysis test, it seems that ECRA,
like the compact and commission in question in U.S. Steel, would
survive. The agreement does not enhance “state power quoad the
National Government” and it does not authorize the member states to do
anything they could not otherwise do in its absence.111 The states were
free to determine how they would cast their electoral votes before this
agreement, and so they would remain—they would assign their electoral
votes according to the agreement, or they could assign their electors in
whatever ever other method they choose.112 The power and supremacy
of the federal government are unchanged.
Yet, one could argue that there is indeed some vertical alteration of
power. The Framers assumed that the election of the President would
often require resort to the House of Representatives; in the absence of a
stable two-party system, it did not seem inevitable that all presidential
elections would result in a majority vote total for any single candidate.113
Under the current plan, there could never be a situation where the House
decisions of either State can be conclusive”). See also JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL:
A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE (2006); Robert
W. Bennett, State Coordination in Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional
Amendment, 5 GREEN BAG 141, 149 (2002).
108. The attention that ECRA would bring to this area of law might displace the current
regime. The exposure that this agreement would force upon the otherwise little-considered law of
interstate compacts might inspire a move away from the functional analysis that now dominates the
field, to a more cautious and perhaps textually faithful approach.
109. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
110. Were the Court to consider the “alternative framing,” see supra Part III.D, then the
agreement would be considered within the Compact Clause, though it would nonetheless be exempt
from the consent requirement.
111. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1978).
112. For the constitutional requirements that create and cabin state prerogative in assigning
electors, see notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“But
as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe
to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that . . . the House of Representatives
shall [elect the President].”).
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selected the President, as the electoral vote is guaranteed to constitute a
majority of the total as a precondition of enactment of ECRA. Whether
the destruction of such a remote and highly contingent power would be
considered anything but a de miminis encroachment on the federal
prerogative is difficult to predict,114 but the possibility does remain.
More dangerous to ECRA is the possibility that such a high profile
agreement would stir the Court from its slumber with respect horizontal
federalism. It might, for instance, treat the agreement as a problem of
troublesome delegation and dilution of state responsibility: States as
political units are no longer making electoral decisions on their own, but
are instead linking those decisions to the undivided citizenry.115 The
rejoinder would be that states are free to abolish the statewide vote as a
matter of discretion; inasmuch as the agreement in question counts the
vote of its citizens as a fraction of the national total, it would still be
doing more than it is required to do—the greater power (to abolish the
vote) should imply the lesser (fractional impact). A sur-rebuttal would
go something like: In the case of abolishment of the vote, the state would
presumably exercise some other form of unmitigated, uncompromised,
and undiluted state control—the state would persist as the relevant unit
of electoral choice and would not be delegating that choice to the
national electorate.116
Another horizontal federalism argument would come in more
simple form. Florida, for instance, could argue that the agreement
reduces its power relative to the member states, thereby triggering the
functional requirement. Even if we were to assume arguendo that such
an argument could get past the current assumption that political power of
states matters only as a proxy for concerns of vertical federalism, “any
judgment of ‘enhancement’ requires a baseline for comparison.”117
Setting this baseline at today’s distribution of electoral clout seems
legally arbitrary—today’s distribution is not a matter of legal right or
inherent constitutional architecture, but is instead an accident of
114. The power in question is now provided for explicitly in the 12th Amendment, which
displaced the prior (though functionally identical) clause in Article II. U.S. CONST. amend. XII
(“The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President . . . and if no
person have such majority, then . . . the House of Representatives shall choose immediately . . . the
President.”).
115. See Greve, supra note 8, at 368 (suggesting a new functional test which would require
consent if one of the following four risks exist: exercise of powers concurrently possessed by
Congress; interstate externalities; cartelization; or agency problems, among which might be the
dilution of political accountability and a delegation of legislative or executive power).
116. These arguments regarding greater includes the less and delegation are relevant also to the
external constitutional critique. See infra Part III.C.
117. Bennett, State Coordination, supra note 4, at 146.
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demographics. Further, insofar as the winner-take-all system produces a
bias not intended by the Framers, ECRA simply restores the
constitutional default principle.118 Thus, power enhancement arguments,
without more, should fail, given the “highly contingent and
unpredictable” nature of the mechanics of the current system.119
One could also argue that ECRA goes further than the proposal in
U.S. Steel, and therefore, that congressional consent would be required.
Though there may not be a commission created under ECRA—assuming
that a commission to monitor the popular vote is not necessary120—states
would be committed at least through one election cycle, and perhaps
longer, depending on the length specified in the agreement.121 And
ability to modify one’s participation or withdraw entirely from an
agreement is one of the “indicia” going to the consent analysis in
Compact Clause jurisprudence.122
Yet, under current doctrine, it seems ECRA would be exempt from
the consent requirement. 123
B. Enforcement
As congressional consent is not a requirement under U.S. Steel
analysis, we might turn to Cuyler as an alternative basis for converting
ECRA into federal law and creating a federal forum for any potential
disputes. Under Cuyler, this would require congressional approval of
the plan. While this is not an impossibility, neither would this be an
easy process. Many states—all the non-party states—would presumably
vote against ECRA in the Senate, and even in the House, there is no
guarantee that all members would consider ECRA an attractive
proposition.124 Further, the requirement that the subject matter of the
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. See supra Part I; Amar & Amar, Direct National Election, supra note 7 (discussing the
potential need for an election commission); JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATEBASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE (2006).
121. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 457 (1978) (parties were free
to leave the compact at any point by enacting a repealing statute). Without such a statute, the
agreement would be binding in perpetuity, escapable only if all other parties agree. See Hasday,
supra note 90, at 3 (“A state may not unilaterally nullify, revoke, or amend one of its compacts if
the compact does not so provide . . . .”) (citing Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951); Green v.
Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 13 (1823)).
122. C.f. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472
U.S. 159, 175 (1985) (noting that the parties could modify or withdraw their agreement).
123. See generally, Greve, supra note 8 for an criticism of the current doctrine.
124. One could imagine many Texas Republicans or California Democrats suspicious of any
plan that risks the delivery of their state to its traditional winner. This is also to say nothing of the
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agreement be an appropriate subject for congressional legislation125 may
limit the viability of this option. We have an unequivocally statecentered regime of Electoral College control, and it would seem quite
hard to square the subject of this agreement with that constitutional
design. In fact, the very appeal of ECRA is that it circumvents that
design. It therefore seems that, under Cuyler, congressional consent
would fail to convert ECRA to federal law. It is possible that the Cuyler
rule could be extended to reflect the suggestion Part III D that the
“appropriate subject matter” limitation is misguided. The new rule
would then be that every time Congress consents to an interstate
agreement, the agreement becomes federal law. This seems an
eminently reasonable and possible holding. As discussed previously, it
is unclear what this concept adds to the regime anyway. The subject
matter of the compact itself only seems relevant under a theory of
delegation whereby Congress is simply delegating its lawmaking
authority to the states. But such a theory would seemingly violate the
Presentment Clause in that the President is excluded from the process.126
Also, the language of Cuyler does not seem entirely consistent with the
view that there must be a separate source of congressional power: “[T]he
consent of Congress transforms the States’ agreement into federal law
under the Compact Clause.”127 It must be under operation of the
Compact Clause, then, that federal law is created in this area. And it
therefore seems irrelevant whether the subject is one that could be
regulated under, say, the Commerce Clause.
Alternative methods for achieving enforceability of ECRA also
exist. This is good news for ECRA, considering the possibility that a
state, faced with giving the election to its disfavored candidate, would
point to a subsequent state statute—presumably passed in an emergency
legislative act as the election outcome crystallized—or some gloss on
their constitution, or even a refusal to certify the relevant slate by the
state’s executive branch, as an excuse against performance. And under
the great strain of political pressure, without the availability of the
federal judiciary, it seems the entire agreement could become unstable.
There seem to be a number of methods for enforcement.
The first, most simple method might be under the Contracts Clause

potential that various senators and representatives might consider the entire plan unconstitutional or
simply unsound as a policy matter.
125. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981); see supra Part III.D.
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
127. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 440.
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of the Constitution.128 Second, where one State sued another on the
agreement, original jurisdiction would apply in the Supreme Court.129
Further, even under simple diversity jurisdiction a federal court could
interpret the agreement as state law, but it could do so with greater
neutrality.
Another method of enforcement would be to consider the
agreement itself federal law. The Cuyler holding could be extended to
the alternative framing put forward in Part III D, whereby the agreement
itself is considered federalized and enforceable as federal law, even
absent congressional approval. These alternatives will be addressed in
turn below.
1. The Contracts Clause and Interstate Agreements
It is well-settled that interstate compacts are contracts between the
member states, covered by the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.130
Indeed, an interstate compact is “an exception to the rule that one
legislature many not restrict its successors.”131 Further, specific
performance is available as a remedy in the case of a violation.132 Yet, it
may be argued that these principles apply only in the case of interstate
compacts under the Compact Clause, and, per U.S. Steel, ECRA is
simply not such a compact. This argument is unpersuasive. Even if
ECRA is not an interstate compact, it is undeniably a contractual
obligation shared between states. As one author has noted,
[B]ecause a pact is a contract, and the federal courts have a duty to
enforce contracts between states, then the interpretation of any pact
(even one to which Congress has not consented) would present a
federal question. Thus, the role of the federal courts here is completely
independent of Congress’ role in granting or withholding its
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
129. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. While a full discussion of the relationship between grants of
jurisdiction and substantive law is outside the scope of this discussion, the Court has “fashioned a
body of federal common law in interstate disputes as an implication of the jurisdictional grant and
the obvious difficulty with applying the law of either disputant.” HENRY M. HART ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 738 (5th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (citing Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1031-32 (1967)).
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951) (holding that “an
agreement solemnly entered into between States by those who alone have political authority to
speak for a State can be unilaterally nullified . . . .”); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 92
(1823) (explaining that “a State has no more power to impair an obligation into which she herself
has entered, than she can the contracts of individuals”).
131. Hasday, supra note 90, at 2.
132. See Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 178 (1930).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 4
SCHLEIFERFINAL.DOC

744

5/14/2007 12:49:10 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:717

consent.133

Therefore, ECRA could be enforced by the federal courts through
the Contracts Clause, whether the suit was brought by one state against
another (giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction), on diversity
jurisdiction, or on appeal from a state court.
2. Diversity Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
Alternatively, if the case were brought on diversity jurisdiction, the
federal courts could simply apply the relevant law of the agreement
itself. If that law were simply the laws of the states, then, at the very
least, there would be a more neutral forum for adjudication. But just as
easily and far more effectively, ECRA itself could specify explicitly the
law governing the agreement. And if ECRA were to specify substantive
federal law of some kind—even Maritime law—it seems that the courts
could apply federal law to the agreement, greatly improving its
enforceability.134
3. Extension of Cuyler and “Quasi-Common Law”
Just as a functional analysis drives the question of congressional
consent, a functional argument may provide another argument for the
extension of federal jurisdiction to enforce ECRA. To make explicit
what has been thus far assumed in this section, federal courts provide
more neutral fora for the settlement of interstate compact disputes and
allow for a better preservation of sovereignty interests and the interests
of non-party states.135 Indeed, this view finds support in Sims, where the
Court states:
A State cannot be its own ultimate judge in a controversy with a sister
State. To determine the nature and scope of obligations as between
States, whether they arise through the legislative means of compact or
the “federal common law” governing interstate controversies . . . is the
function and duty of the Supreme Court . . . . Deference is one thing;
submission to a State’s own determination of whether it has
undertaken an obligation, what that obligation is, and whether it
conflicts with a disability of the State to undertake it is quite
133. See Eichorn, supra note 97, at 1404 n.87.
134. Id. at 1407 nn.100-01. Again, the fact of a federal forum is itself perhaps the most
important part of ensuring neutrality and enforcement, and anyway, federal common law may trump
state law if the court infers that common law applies through inference or by applying Hinderlider.
Id.
135. Note, Charting No Man’s Land, supra note 87, at 2002.
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another.136

In light of these concerns, perhaps ECRA could inspire a needed
overhaul of the underpinnings of the entire interstate agreement regime.
Currently, and as was discussed in Part III D, the Court treats
agreements which do not require consent as something other than
agreements under the Compact Clause. Yet that may be an unnecessary
conflation of two separate principles. For it is in no way preordained or
obvious that an agreement ceases to be an agreement simply because it
does not fall under a constitutional regime of consent. That is to say, an
agreement that, per U.S. Steel, does not require consent of Congress may
not be an agreement or compact qua the consent requirement of Article
I, § 10, clause 3 of the Constitution, but it may still be considered an
interstate agreement as far as the above-quoted language from Sims
goes. And if that is the case, there is no persuasive reason to deny to the
parties enforcement measures in these sorts of agreements that they
would otherwise enjoy under the Compact Clause. It seems no more
inherent to our constitutional system that we imagine interstate
agreements transformed via congressional consent than that we consider
such interstate agreements transformed into federal law, particularly if
the functionalist thrust remains viable.137
This position may be all the more compelling after Bush v. Gore,
inasmuch as that decision suggested that national elections implicate
uniquely national interests, which militates against a showing of overdeference to state regimes.138 Moreover, Bush v. Gore might also
provide insight into the Court’s willingness to review suspect state court
interpretations and applications of ECRA, (which would be state law)
inasmuch as such state law determinations related to the national
presidential election.139 Thus, Sims may arguably leave the door open
for a regime of quasi-federal common law for the enforcement of
interstate agreements that are not already transformed, per Cuyler, into
federal law.140
The argument for federal common law is not totally without
support. In Texas Industries v. Radcliff,141 the Court, in considering the
136. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951).
137. Note, Charting No Man’s Land, supra note 87, at 2002.
138. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000).
139. For analysis of the issue of state court determinations of state law in light of Bush v. Gore,
see generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State
Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1919 (2003).
140. See Sims, 341 U.S. at 28.
141. 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
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extent to which federal common law could be extended to protect
uniquely federal interests, said:
In these instances, our federal system does not permit the controversy
to be resolved under state law, either because the authority and duties
of the United States as sovereign are intimately involved or because
the interstate or international nature of the controversy makes it
inappropriate for state law to control.142

The extension of federal common law to cover interstate
arrangements and to prevent self-judging evasions by states, evasions
which would bring disharmony to the federal system, finds at least some
support in the logic of the federal system and in the language of the
Court.143
C. External Constitutional Critiques
Apart from the myriad strategic infirmities that are internal to
ECRA and have been examined thus far—collective action problems,
coordination problems, consent requirements, and enforceability—there
may be a trumping argument, an external constitutional critique that
ultimately stands in the way of any electoral reform of this nature. The
basic argument would go: “ECRA is just an attempt to amend the
Constitution without going through the process set forth in Article V; it
is an obvious attempt at an end-run and you just can’t destroy an
institution that has existed since the founding and that was retained even
in the Twelfth Amendment. We have a process for this and you can’t
get around it.”
This argument may gain support from U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton,144 where the Court held that states may not impose term limits
or any other qualifications in addition to those set forth in Article II of
the Constitution, and Clinton v. New York,145 where the Court struck
down the Line Item Veto Act by holding that the Act departed from the
“finely wrought” procedure established for the passage of legislative
enactments.146 To the extent that these cases demonstrate a distrust of
142. Id. at 641; see also TRIBE, supra note 90, § 3-23, at 474 (discussing federal common law
and distinguishing procedural federal common law).
143. Further, federal common law may apply as per Supreme Court doctrine, see supra notes
111 and 141 and accompanying text, and where approval is provided by Congress, interpretation of
the compact itself requires interpretation of an act of Congress, which may reach the predicate
agreement. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 134, at 738-41. See also note 134.
144. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
145. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
146. Id. at 439-40 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983)).
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end-runs around established architectural provisions of our constitution,
ECRA may face a hurdle. The Court may not favor overly formalistic or
glibly literalist attempts to obviate established practice in favor of a
pragmatic program for reform.
There are a number of potential responses to this sort of challenge.
Starting with the most obvious, it can be said that under the Constitution,
“the actual appointment of electors is left up to the states . . . .”147
Indeed, the Constitution itself states, “Each State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors . . . .”148 To state the obvious, it does not specify in any way
how the legislature shall do its directing. While it is true that every state
now chooses popular election as its preferred method of appointment,
every state retains the right to assign electors as it pleases. The states are
free to abolish all voting entirely if they wish. Under a greater-includesthe-lesser argument, it seems that counting one’s own state’s votes as a
denominator in a larger fraction of the entire national vote should remain
within the limits of a grant of state power that is, after all, virtually
limitless.149 Yet, a mere greater-includes-the-lesser argument is often a
sign that one is in trouble—the U.S. Reports are a graveyard of these
arguments.150
There is, however, a more nuanced way to respond to the argument.
With ECRA there is no infringement of other clauses of the Constitution,
nor is there a frustration of the very provision in question. The Twelfth
Amendment says nothing about particular means for selection of
electors, and the Framers themselves clearly assumed that process of
elector selection was left to the states themselves to choose in the

147. HARDAWAY, supra note 1, at 47.
148. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
149. The power is, of course, not limitless. A State could not violate other provisions of the
Constitution; it could not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment by
discriminating among voters. McPherson v. Blacker established that the discretion was virtually
unlimited, and Williams v. Rhodes establishes that states cannot violate other provisions such as the
14th Amendment. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968). This example is a good one for the demonstration that the greater-includes-the-less
argument is often unhelpful and fallacious. One can execute a person convicted of a capital crime,
though torture would violate the 8th Amendment. Also, viewpoint discrimination in 1st
Amendment cases demonstrates that mere ability to exclude all speech does not confer an ability to
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. Also, more to the point, Bush v. Gore demonstrates that
while the individual has on right to vote for a presidential election, equal protection principles
constrain state action once the franchise is granted. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
150. See, e.g., 44 Liquor Mart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 510 (1996); City of Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer Publisher, 486 U.S. 763 (1988); Delta Airlines v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 368 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 4
SCHLEIFERFINAL.DOC

748

5/14/2007 12:49:10 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:717

manner they saw fit.151
We might look to Thornton for some support. There, the Court
held that “if the qualifications for Congress are fixed in the
Constitution,”152 the states cannot indirectly impose additional violations
that alter that fixed constellation. It then went on to say that an attempt
to effect a “fundamental change in the constitutional framework . . .
must come not by legislation . . . but rather—as have other important
changes in the electoral process—through the amendment procedures set
forth in Article V.”153
This statement helps the defense of ECRA. By proving that rule, it
may help our exception. The original understanding of the Electoral
College system was based upon the lack of a two-party system and an
assumption that there was more than one way to select an elector.
Taking the Court at its word above, we must therefore conclude that the
current electoral scheme, whereby the states choose to employ a winnertake-all, popular vote, two-party system methodology, effectively
precluding any House involvement, and which has enormous strategic
impacts that we have recited in Part I supra, did not “count” as such a
change to the electoral system. Thus, neither should ECRA.
It might be argued alternatively that the original system was meant
to enhance federalism by forcing states to be the relevant units of
decision, and to delegate that choice to the undifferentiated national
government violates the architecture of the Constitution. Yet, as is
discussed in Part I, it is by no means clear that the values of federalism
are advanced by our current system. Further, it may very well be that
ECRA is the best way, in the estimation of each state—the relevant
decisional— to maximize its voice in the federal system, a system which
exists to give meaning to such voices. If, as an empirical matter, it
seems that ECRA better allows states to register on the national radar
screen, and the current system eliminates their relevance, it would be
odd to say that federalism requires states to ignore the policy preferences
of its citizens, as actualized by legislative enactment of ECRA.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article reviews a proposal for an interstate agreement for
Electoral College reform. Given the considerable unpopularity of the
current system and the considerable difficulty of achieving a
151. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 114, at 414.
152. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 836 (1995).
153. Id. at 837.
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constitutional amendment, along with the effective party parity in the
presidential elections that exists today, such a proposal may be
strategically viable. Further, the current doctrinal gloss in this area may
create legal space for states with sufficient political will. More
modestly, such a plan exposes important fault lines and weaknesses in
the current regime of interstate agreements. While the ECRA is almost
certainly viable even without congressional consent under U.S. Steel,
this proposal might be the camel that breaks the straw.
In considering issues of enforcement, this Article has similarly
demonstrated that the current law, while susceptible to a number of
modalities of enforcement, or, at the very least, modest extensions of
current doctrine, may be unequal to the task of coping with an agreement
of the type contemplated by ECRA.
Irrespective of outlines of the proposed agreement itself, this
Article demonstrates a need for greater attention to the law of interstate
agreements, and allows an examination of the tension between the need
for responsive and creative legal solutions to multi-state problems and
the duty of fidelity to our constitutional structure.
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